"Western Aleppo is Liberated" and Awaiting the Counter-Attack
48 hours into the opposition's first offensive in seven years.
Late on November 28, the head of the Fatah Mubin operations room announced the near total control of the western Aleppo countryside, stating that demining would soon commence and then the civilians displaced by the regime’s advance five years ago would be allowed to return. The announcement marked the end of a second day of major opposition advances, as well as the opening of the second front in Saraqib.
Day Two Gains
Most of the fighting on November 28th was focused on the southern axis. Fatah Mubin (FM) forces advanced on Sheikh Aqil and Muhandiseen early in the morning, expanding the frontline south from Regiment 46 and Kafr Naha, respectively. They then closed the small pocket by liberating Kafr Joum, placing FM forces adjacent to the M5 Highway along a nearly 8 mile stretch. Other units continued the push on the northern side of this front over the course of the afternoon, fully liberating Khan Assal, Kafr Dael, and Mansoura and placing them on the doorstep of Aleppo’s western suburbs. One the southern side, opposition units cut the M5 by seizing the town of Zerba, effectively cutting the major regime artery to Aleppo city and placing the remaining regime forces south of Zerba in danger of being stranded. By evening the opposition had cleared Kafr Halab as well.
Fatah Mubin also diverted some units to the Saraqib front over the course of the night / early morning. These units launched a new ground assault in the morning, targeting and eventually seizing Dadikh, Tarnaba, and Kafr Battikh. These forward infantry units were supported by artillery and ATGM units further back which were able to target any regime forces attempting to push south from Saraqib. From here, some FM infantry advanced into the southern neighborhood of Saraqib. Clashes were reported here throughout the day but no clear progress was made by nightfall. According to one opposition fighter on this front, the most difficult part of the initial advance was maneuvering through the hilly terrain on the western side of Dadikh in order to get clear lines of sight on southern Saraqib. Despite the uncertain progress on the city itself, the capture of these three villages gave the opposition fire control over the M5 south of Saraqib, effectively cutting the city from resupply.
Lastly, some progress was made on the Anadan axis, though it seems that the opposition committed minimal resources here this day. Units advanced on and captured the village of Yaqid Adas, placing them less than 1.5 miles from Anadan.
Regime death reports continue to trickle in, and like the first day continue to contain many mid-ranking officers. Two more colonels were reported killed - bringing the total two three - as well as another major and three captains. A senior Iranian general from the IRGC was also reported killed, likely on November 27.
The death of the IRGC general brings up the question of Iranian and Hezbollah presence - or lack thereof - on the west Aleppo axis. This area had been the center of Iranian and Hezbollah direct ground involvement, especially during the regime’s 2019-2020 offensive that resulted in the original capture of these villages. Evidence of their presence this time has been more limited, possibly suggesting that they have pulled back in the past year due to their war with Israel. However, joining the IRGC general were the confirmed deaths of at least 14 militia fighters from the Shia villages of Nubl and Zahraa. These men, among them a unit commander, all appear to have been killed on the 28th in Sheikh Aqil and Muhadiseen in the south, and in Yaqid Adas in the north.
Where are the Russians?
Now two days into the opposition’s first true offensive since 2017, one looming question remains: Where is the Russian Airforce? Russian jets have been the backbone of regime defensive and offensive capabilities ever since Moscow deployed its army to Syria in October 2015. During the regime’s 2019 northwest offensive, Russian jets played a key role in hammering every frontline village held by the opposition until they were uninhabitable. Even during the four-year “ceasefire”, Russia conducted massive bombing campaigns against civilian and military targets across Idlib at least once each year, often for punitive measures in response to small opposition attacks.
“The jets are striking, but at a slower pace than all the battles I have fought since the beginning of the revolution.”
Yet Russian jets have barely been present for the past 48 hours. The most intense bombing occurred late in the night on November 27 when jets struck Atareb and near Saraqib. Later on November 28 a Russian jet bombed a home in Atareb, killing 14 civilians. There was also a reported uptick in Russian airstrikes around Saraqib throughout the day in response to the opposition’s initial advances. Nonetheless, as an opposition fighter on the Saraqib front told the author, “the jets are striking, but at a slower pace than all the battles I have fought since the beginning of the revolution.”
The lack of Russian air involvement may hint at one reason for the rapid collapse of regime lines. The Russians have spent years gradually emplacing Syrian units that they support across the Idlib frontline. The regime’s 30th Division - closely backed by Russia - took over the primary defense responsibilities of west Aleppo following the 2020 ceasefire. It is possible that Russian commanders were supposed to play a key role in command and control of these Syrian units in case of any opposition attack, in which case their absence now would have induced a significant amount of chaos through the chain of command.
Regardless, Russian jets have yet to bomb anywhere close to the degree they have in the past, and regime lines have now collapsed to the Aleppo suburbs. The opposition is still suffering high casualties from the fighting, but as long as they can maintain unmolested supply lines and functioning fighting positions on the frontlines, they stand a good change of securing their gains.
Regime Reinforcements Arrive
It seems this will be put to the test over the coming days, as regime reinforcements have finally begun entering Aleppo city. Additional units of the Military Intelligence and the Russian-back 25th Division arrived in Aleppo throughout the afternoon and evening of November 28. Meanwhile, Major General Suhail Hassan - the recently appointed commander of Syria’s Special Forces - was pictured directing new tank and infantry units at the Hamdaniyah Roundabout in the evening. Pro-regime media also reported the deployment of Iranian-backed Local Defense Forces from the Aleppo countryside and the arrival of the 4th Armored Division’s 42nd Brigade during the night (the brigade played a large role in the initial capture of west Aleppo in late 2019).
Pro-regime pages began announcing a series of successful counter attacks throughout the night. Loyalist have claimed the recapture of Dadikh, Kafr Battikh, and Tarnaba (effectively rolling back all of the opposition’s Saraqib gains and re-opening the highway to the city). Others have claimed that Bashnatrah and Bashqatin were recaptured, though it is unclear how, as these two villages sit west of Mansoura and Kafr Dael and south of Yaqid Adas. These claims have been made with no video or picture evidence, and may just as easily be morale-boosting propaganda as have any truth to them. However, it does seem clear that the regime has finally mobilized its first wave of reinforcements to the city.
As November 29th dawns, the opposition is likely to concentrate its forces on three axes. First, on Saraqib, opposition units may continue to try to take the city or simply work to expand their control over the highway (assuming the regime’s claims of recapturing the villages are untrue). Second, on the southern axis of west Aleppo, opposition forces will likely try to expand their line eastward towards Khan Touman and, most importantly, el-Eis. Capturing the strategic el-Eis town and hill would be key for securing this rapidly growing southern flank, but may also prove to require extensive opposition resources. Finally, the opposition will likely begin to focus on the Anadan front, perhaps advancing directly on the city or attempting to cut it off by flanking north or south. Fatah Mubin may also be hoping to time this advance with a potential opening of the Syrian National Army frontline in Afrin and Tel Rifaat, which would help divert regime resources in this area.
Two days into Operation “Deterring the Aggression”, the opposition has secured major gains and appears on the verge of achieving more. However, the next two days will likely prove critical in determining just how sustainable these advances are. In addition to the question of Turkey’s future role in this offensive, the major questions now are if and when the Russians up their air sorties, and whether the regime’s new reinforcements and much-hyped initial advances prove viable.