The Revolution Returns to Hama and the Regime Regroups
Day 4 of the offensive sees sweeping gains in Idlib and northern Hama but the potential for more serious fighting ahead
Opposition forces advanced deep into the countryside of all axes on November 30, taking advantage of their urban gains over the previous 24 hours. In Aleppo, Fatah Mubin took Nubl and Zahara without a fight, as the Shia residents of both towns reportedly fled through Tel Rifaat to regime territory. In eastern Aleppo, opposition units quickly advanced on Neyrab and towards the key city of Safira. Meanwhile, the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) appears to have struck some sort of deal with the regime and drove several large convoys up the Raqqa-Aleppo highway, taking over regime positions in the Aleppo International Airport and northeast neighborhoods of Aleppo city. SDF and Fatah Mubin leadership reportedly entered into negotiations which resulted in the non-violent handover of control of the airport while the SDF retained control of a coorridor connecting the Kurdish neighborhood of Sheikh Maqsoud to Tel Rifaat in the north and Hanano and Shiekh Najjar in the east. However, the SDF’s move triggered the first Syrian National Army (SNA) advance of the offensive, with the SNA quickly seizing Tadef and the Kweires Airbase from regime forces, effectively cutting the Aleppo-Raqqa highway from the SDF.
Further south, opposition forces continued their steady advance east of Saraqib, quickly seizing Abu Dhuhur Airbase and then turning south to clear the rest of southeast Idlib. These areas appeared to fall without much resistance, a trend that would continue throughout the day. From Khan Sabeel and Jabal Zawiyah, other opposition units began a speedy advance south through southern Idlib and into northern Hama. Claims of territorial changes here were chaotic throughout the day, as city after city appeared to be abandoned by the regime. Maarat al-Numan put up minimal fight, with at least one regime soldier reported killed there. Most of the other towns appeared to be abandoned before the opposition arrived.
Regime forces were rapidly pulling their dispersed units south to establish a new defensive line in between Qomhana and Taybat al-Imam that afternoon. There seemed to be more resistance as the opposition approached this line, with regime units less quick to abandon their towns. At least two opposition fighters were killed during the capture of Morek, for example. As evening approached, pro-opposition media was awash with claims that they had not only captured the Christian towns of Suqaylabiyah and Muhradeh, but that the gateway to Hama had falled - Qomhana and Mount Zain al-Abidin. A video was published after sunset showing a cheering convoy of opposition fighter entering the northeast Hama neighborhood of al-Arbaen, and rumors began spreading that the regime had completely abandoned the city. At the same time, videos were published appearing to show locals in Talbiseh and Rastan attacking regime forces stationed in their towns. This apparent new insurgency would mean that the Hama-Homs highway was cut, and with regime forces evacuating Hama, the city had effectively fallen.
However, regime soldiers soon began posting videos of themselves gathering in northern Hama city, and then inside Qomhana, Suqaylabiyah, and Muhradeh. While some opposition fighters had advanced into the edge of Hama city, they had quickly withdrawn when they found security forces still in the city. This part of Hama is the bedrock of one of the largest pro-regime militia networks in Syria, and these local fighters had been organizing inside Hama throughout the afternoon as retreating army units from the north and advancing army units from Damascus converged on the city.
Meanwhile, it increasingly appears that the regime has managed to hold onto four key points on the Aleppo front. Both pro-regime and pro-opposition media has begun hinting at regime forces besieged in the Zahraa Artillery Battalion, Military Engineering Academy, and Artillery College in west Aleppo city (pro-regime users with family and friends in the colleges have been posting about “praying for their safe return” and “the steadfast fortress” as well as well as announcing more than ten soldiers killed in the academy today, while pro-opposition accounts in Aleppo have been warning drivers to be careful when driving near these locations because they remain under enemy control). Claims have also been made that while the city of Safira has been liberated, the infamous Safira Defense Factories - where Assad and his Iranian allies produce their chemical weapons and large missiles - remains in regime hands. This heavily fortified compound provides the regime with a powerful potential foothold from which to cut the opposition’s eastern Aleppo salient, while the besieged pockets in west Aleppo will stress opposition manpower that may sorely be needed in the south.
Why the collapse?
Four days into this unprecedented event, we can begin to explore why the regime’s security forces initially collapsed. Previous editions of this coverage have already discussed the absence of the Russian Air Force and how the practice of tafyish meant regime positions were chronically undermanned. However there are additional factors that may have contributed to the collapse in the chain of command. Since 2018, Russian officers in Syria have attempted to reform the way in which senior Syrian officers operate on the battlefield. Long-time watchers of Syria’s war will remember that for most of the war, senior regime commanders were constantly being killed in battles. According to a Syrian officer the author spoke with in 2019, the Russians attempted to mitigate this issue by encouraging regime officers to stop leading from the frontlines and instead operate from far in the rear, where they were safer and theoretically could more easily organize their forces. This change in practice was apparent in the 2018 East Ghouta offensive, and especially during the 2019 northwest offensive, both of which saw a far reduced number of senior regime deaths.
Now, with the launch of this newest opposition offensive, senior commanders who have been ingrained with leading from the rear were not present when their units came under attack and communications lost. These units, unable to contact their battalion or brigade commanders, were then left to make decisions on their own, a practice not common to Syrian military doctrine. This may help explain the complete collapse of command communication (which has been confirmed by several regime fighters), and the resulting case where some units attempted to fight while others simply ran.
Complicating matter further is the growing evidence that regime forces faced at least some desertions during the first three days of the offensive. Posts began emerging as early as November 28 on pro-regime coastal pages celebrating the “safe return” of officers from those towns “from the battles in Aleppo” - a fairly clear sign that the men had simply abandoned their units and returned home. A former pro-regime fighter who traveled through Hama on November 30 confirmed to the author that he both saw and heard from others of additional desertions occurring throughout the day as regime units continued to fall south.
While these factors likely contributed to the widespread collapse of the first days of the offensive, it remains to be seen if they will continue to be a major factor going forward.
Looming regime counter attack
Now a clear defensive line has been established for the first time. Pro-regime media has been rife with claims of counter-attacks throughout the night, claiming to have recaptured several towns north of Qomhana as well as opening a new axis in southeast Idlib via the regime positions in Salamiyah. There is not yet any visual evidence to support these claims. However, unlike the previous three days’ advances, this southern advance appeared to be conducted in a less coordinated manner with fewer opposition units, seeking to exploit a retreating regime more than to move forward carefully. It is unlikely that Fatah Mubin forces have established their own strong defensive lines on this front yet and may very well have pulled out of some forward positions back to the larger cities of Khan Sheikhoun, Lataminah, and Kafr Nabudeh.
Shortly after sunrise, a member of the Qomhana-based Tarmeh regiment filmed himself driving back to Hama city claiming that they had just entered the towns of Maardes, Souran, and Taybat al-Imam and faced no resistance, the towns empty of any opposition. A local pro-regime Facebook page similarly claimed that at 4:00am regime forces had managed to re-secure Halfaya and Qalaat al-Mudiq, while a video emerged around that same time showing local regime militiamen with four captured opposition fighters who were caught “outside Qalaat al-Mudiq while trying to enter the town which they thought had been liberated”.
The next 24-48 hours will be an important test for the opposition. Fatah Mubin will need to be able to shift enough resources south to blunt and potentially turn any regime counter attack while also securing eastern Aleppo from any potential attack from both Safira and the besieged pockets. The “easy” part of the offensive is over, now they must secure their new gains.