"Confront the Demonstrators": The Regime's 2011 invasion of Douma
One year of Republican Guard operations in East Ghouta, in their own words
Biographies of regime soldiers and stories of the battles they fought have gradually appeared online in recent years. These often take the form of eulogizing a long-dead officer or extolling a battle the army won ‘despite all odds’ - or lost after ‘months of valiant effort’. Naturally, these stories are written from the regime’s perspective and laden with propaganda, half truths and outright lies. However, they can still offer important insights into the regime’s actions throughout the war. At times, there is even alignment between the regime’s and opposition’s narratives on key events. These periods of alignment, recorded by regime loyalists themselves, should create immutable moments in the record of the history of Syria’s revolution.
In early 2021 a rare biography was published by a pro-regime Facebook page. Over 6,000 words long, the post tells the story of Republican Guard Brigadier Kamal Atiyeh, who was paralyzed in October 2015 during fighting in Deir Ez Zor. The story details not just his personal role in the war but that of other units involved in the same battles he fought in, first in Douma in May 2011, then Homs in summer 2012, and finally for three years in Deir Ez Zor.
Each of these events will be given their own installment. The first focuses on the Republican Guard’s response to protests in Douma, their initial deployment to the city in May, “confronting protestors” that spring, creating a ring of checkpoints around the city, and culminating in the regime’s first major military offensive in Eastern Ghouta in January 2012. The second installment will look at Homs city from June through September 2012, when Atiyeh’s battalion deployed to support operations in the city following the regime’s ethnic cleansing of several neighborhoods earlier in the year. The final installment will look at Deir Ez Zor from late 2012 through October 2015, when the 104th Brigade deployed the bulk of its forces to the Euphrates to battle the rapidly growing armed revolution and the besieging of regime forces within Deir Ez Zor city.
The account has been transcribed below, unedited in order to preserve its authenticity. Of course, the account claims the protesters were violent, the security forces unarmed and restrained. This is an unsurprising narrative. But a close read shows that even within this pro-regime spin, the account still admits to several long-standing accusations against it. I will periodically interject with additional context or to highlight these important aspects of the passage.
Douma, April 2011
Kamal Atiyeh was born in an Alawite village in the Safita countryside of Tartous on January 3, 1966. He joined the Military College in 1985 and was assigned to the Republican Guard upon graduating in 1988. He graduated through several advanced courses in the ensuing decades, including the famous “Thunderbolt” course in 1995. When the revolution began, Atiyeh, now a colonel, was commanding the 104th Brigade’s 3rd Battalion, serving directly under the infamous war criminals Brigadier Ali Khuzam and Brigadier Issam Zahredinne.
“With the beginning of the global war on Syria and the events that the country witnessed, the 104th Brigade, led by the defector Manaf Tlass, and its Chief of Staff, the martyr General Issam Zahreddine, and the commander of the 3rd Mechanized Battalion, General Kamal Atiyah, were assigned to work in the city of Douma to support the security forces, confront the demonstrators, restore security, and preserve state institutions and citizens’ livelihoods from the tampering and sabotage of the Takfiri groups.
At that moment they had no idea about the work and what was coming next, they went to Douma in civilian clothes without any kind of weapon, they were distributed to the municipality roundabout [where protests and sit-ins had been held since March], the court, the women's prison and the main street towards the Grand Mosque in the center of Douma.”
“2011 AD After the end of Friday prayers, the worshipers left the mosques of Douma towards the square of the Grand Mosque. Their number exceeded 10,000, and the army personnel did not exceed 250. They headed towards the municipality roundabout. Voices began to rise, "Freedom... Freedom." At that time, the army personnel were distributed on the right and left of the main street. When these mercenaries arrived, they threw sidewalk stones and iron bars at the army personnel and beat them without mercy. An atmosphere of chaos was created and the personnel were withdrawn from the side streets towards the municipality roundabout and the police station. At that time, a large number of personnel were injured.
The demonstrators had arrived at the women's prison and the court and set fire to the court, and the outer section of the women's prison, the office of the director of the prison, and administrative offices and smashed a number of shops
On the same day at 3 pm, General Issam Zahreddine, General Ali Khuzam, General Kamal Atiyah and a number of officers and men were assigned to enter the main street and reach the women’s prison and remove the prisoners from it. At that time, they stormed the prison with cars, and the prisoners were taken out by a qualitative operation carried out by these heroes and those with them. At that moment, the first mission of General Kamal Atiyah came to an end, and then they all returned to the brigade.
After the end of the first mission and the burning of the court by terrorists, the leadership took a decision to intensify the presence of the Republican Guard in Douma every Friday in civilian clothes to calm the demonstrations. But those groups were not as peaceful as they claimed, they declared rebellion and threatened and killed every collaborator with the state and threw the bodies near the roundabout of the martyrs. They wrote on the bodies, "This is the fate of every agent and collaborator with the state and the regime."
The Douma Courthouse was partially burned on April 23, 2011. Some opposition accounts claimed the regime forces set fire to the building, other locals suspected loyalist shabiha groups were behind the attack. This arson attack occurred extremely early during the protest movement, at a time when, as one local remembers, everyone went to great pains to keep the protests civil and pure so as not to give the regime any excuse to retaliate. The 104th Brigade was likely deployed to support the existing police and mukhabarat forces in the city following this incident, as indicated in the account. These forces were initially deployed in the center of the city at key points along the main road where weekly protests and funerals for those killed by security forces were held each Friday. Regime snipers now used the courthouse rooftop after the arson attack to fire on protestors in the street below, and two days after the arson attack three soldiers were reported killed in an ambush in the city.
Most notably, the account twice admits that Republican Guard soldiers - not just shabiha - were deployed in plain clothes to “confront the demonstrators” during this period. The account also claims that the soldiers in the city were unarmed at this time. However, a full month earlier, on March 25, security forces attacked for the first time a peaceful protest in the city, beating people with stun batons. Then, on April 1, security members dressed in civilian clothes shot and killed eight protestors, according to Human Rights Watch. One resident recalls this month as one of rapid escalation by security forces, with soldiers becoming extremeley aggressive against the protests, storming the crowds and detaining anyone they could.
“At the beginning of the fifth month, after the increase in kidnappings and killings in Douma, the leadership took the decision to deploy the army in military uniform and set up barriers at the exits and entrances of Douma. The Military Technical Institute was made a headquarters for the forces, setting up barriers and running patrols. A reserve group was kept whose mission was to intervene quickly during situations that were difficult to control easily. This group succeeded greatly in calming the demonstrations and controlling them. All of this without weapons, due to the leadership’s directives not to use weapons.
This matter prompted the terrorists to rebel and revive external agendas, including Abu Ali Khabeya in Douma and Ali Afouf’s group in Harasta. Their mission was to threaten, kidnap, kill and torture anyone who dealt with the Syrian state. The notables of Douma did not succeed in calming the situation, but rather the tension increased and women's demonstrations began to appear at night.”
Local activist accounts reported on April 29 that security forces had, for the first time, established a ring of checkpoints around the city, attempting to cut Douma off from the surrounding communities. On May 4 activists reported that additional army units had established themselves along the main street through central Douma. Soldiers began storming the houses of people they suspected had participated in protests. The regime also began cutting the city’s internet and telephone lines each Thursday evening and Friday to try and limit the spread of protests. According to the account, the 104th Brigade established its headquarters are the “Military Technical Institute”, also known as the Vehicle Management Base, which sits between Harasta and Irbeen along Highway 5 just south of Douma.
Of course, the account repeatedly frames security forces as being peaceful, attacked unprovoked by violent locals, yet funerals were being held regularly in Douma throughout April and May for civilians killed by regime forces. The account claims locals were murdering “collaborators” - locals who worked with the intelligence agencies to kidnap men and women involved in protests, who would then be tortured and often murdered in regime prisons. Yet even in its own skewed narrative the regime author does not accuse local armed groups of killing innocent people.
The account indirectly mentions the formation of more organized and armed anti-Assad groups as a response to this military crackdown on the city, specifically under the command of “Abu Ali Khabeya”. According to a local, the first “Free Syrian Army” groups organized in the city were mostly just unarmed young men in masks who would surround the nightly women’s protests to try and protect them from security forces. Mohammed Saeed Wanly (Abu Rashid) was "one of the founders of the Free Syrian Army in Damascus and its countryside, especially in Douma" and helped form the Abu Ubaidah Amer bin al-Jarrah Battalion in September 2011. This group conducted many operations in Douma as well as the broader East Ghouta region. It is unclear what role Khabeya had in the battalion, but in 2012 the unit formed local affiliates like the Martyrs of Rukn al-Din Battalion (which Abu Rashid would lead) and the Martyrs of Douma Battalion (which Khabeya would lead). Khabeya was detained and executed by Jaish al-Islam in 2015 .
Douma, June through August 2011
The security crackdown within Douma city pushed the armed opposition groups into the countryside, where they were more free to organize and grow. This resulted in the expansion of the military conflict from within Douma city into the broader Douma region.
“At the beginning of the sixth month, incitement against Syria increased, and armed groups began to form the so-called Free Army. They were secretly stationed in the farms outside Douma and took advantage of sunset and darkness to shoot at checkpoints randomly and force the soldiers to flee. The army was instructed not to use any type of weapon.
This situation lasted about three months, and Douma was divided militarily into two parts: the northern and western divisions of the 106th Brigade led by General Muhammad Khaddour, and the eastern and southern divisions, for the 104th Brigade led by General Issam Zahreddine.
The Free Army began to increase in the city of Douma, in the farms and in Eastern Ghouta, and the betrayals [defections] increased, and false information was sent to the army and security services, which led to an increase in kidnappings, killings and the spread of chaos, accompanied by an increase in attacks on checkpoints, the army and security.”
The account attempts to paint a picture of a rapidly expanding violent insurgency throughout the summer. Yet the regime’s own funeral records - which were routinely published at the time - reported only 34 deaths of security forces across Damascus between April and August 2011. Of these, 16 can be definitively linked to East Ghouta, with only five occurring in Douma. It was not until later in the fall that opposition forces grew strong enough to inflict more regular casualties on security forces. Meanwhile, regime security forces were themselves becoming increasingly violent. Locals had already recorded 40 civilian deaths in Douma by May 8, 2011 - less than two months into protest movement. By late 2011 snipers were operating around the corniche, shooting randomly on locals. As one resident recalls, children stopped going to school around this time out of fear of the snipers. Many families that could, fled to the East Ghouta countryside, slipping past the ring of checkpoints to find safety in the farms.
Douma and its Environs, January 2012 Operation
Regime combat casualties began to steadily increase starting in October as the increasingly armed opposition began to liberate their towns in rural East Ghouta. The rapid growth of opposition-held territory triggered the first serious regime operation across East Ghouta in late January 2012. While the account claims these events happened “in the eleventh month [November 2011]” there is no evidence that such a largescale operation occurred at this time. Local activists reported in late December that the army was building up units and increasing its bombing of towns in preparation for a large operation, which appears to have been initiated in the last week of January 2012. It was around this time that the army began using mortars and rockets to shell Douma and the countryside, again forcing residents to flee the city. The account gives a detailed description of the army’s advance south from Douma, led by the 104th Brigade with support from the 106th Brigade, 4th Division, and intelligence branches:
“The eleventh month: The first organized attack against the army at the Shifouniya junction checkpoint. The militants’ attacks on the army points increased at that time, and in light of the repeated attacks by the militants, the command took the decision to unload heavy and medium military equipment (tanks, BMP vehicles, and mortars) to reinforce the army’s presence. From here, the confrontation became a military one against the militants.
The army began raiding and attacking the militants' hideouts in Douma farms because they are the most widespread places for them, and the nature of the raid was not easy due to the high walls of the farms.
Armed groups began to take complete control of the villages of Ghouta and attack police stations, government departments and some military units. The leadership took the decision to launch a military operation towards the villages of Ghouta with military equipment.
The 104th Brigade in Douma was again assigned, led by General Issam Zahreddine, General Ali Khazam, General Kamal Attia and others, to move from Douma towards "Misraba - Madira - Beit Sawa - Hamouria - Saqba". Groups were formed and equipment was prepared, including tanks, BMP vehicles and mortars. Morale was very high.
When the movement from Douma towards Misraba began, the Free Syrian Army militants had blocked all roads with 3-meter-high earthen barriers. Army groups with military equipment began storming the buildings to the left and right of the main entrance to Misraba. The militants' resistance was strong and they relied on booby-trapping the barriers and placing booby-trapped cars in the streets. At the end of the day, Misraba was completely controlled, due to the determination and insistence of the Syrian army forces. The next morning, army units continued advancing towards Madira. The resistance was less than Misraba and it fell within hours. The army continued towards Beit Sawa.
In Beit Sawa, an army man was shot in the neck while he was with General Ali Khazam, which led to his martyrdom. At that point, General Ali Khazam realized that the gunman who shot the martyr was stationed in a two-story building. He went with three elements and captured the gunman alive. All the gunmen in Beit Sawa were dealt with, the area was taken over, and the brigade forces continued moving towards Hamouria. High morale played a major role in the success of the battles.
The 104th Brigade continued its advance from Beit Sawa towards Hamouria, which is considered one of the major cities and a gathering center for the opposition and the Free Army. The 106th Brigade advanced from Madira towards Hamouria.
The Syrian army was able to advance from two axes, forcing the militants to withdraw towards Saqba. General Kamal and his colleagues remained in Hamouria for a whole day, and about 75-100 people from the locals were present in their homes. The army's main mission was to expel the militants and arrest the wanted persons. The next morning, the army continued to advance towards Saqba, which is adjacent to the Hamouria buildings. The resistance was stronger.
General Issam Zahreddine divided the city into sectors for the attacking groups and General Kamal's mission was to advance towards the city center "the Great Mosque". He was accompanied by a BMP vehicle and this neighborhood is full of old Arab houses and narrow streets and behind the mosque the first field hospital was discovered and the search continued and another field hospital was discovered and a large warehouse containing all the flags and banners and (a model of the Homs clock) made of wood about 4 meters high (attached to the pictures)
A third and fourth field hospital were discovered and a black Free Army uniform with the Free Army logo on it and a large number of booby-trapped and stolen cars were seized. All this is to complete the scenes of media fabrication by the militants that they started since the beginning of the war on Syria.
The TV documented everything and the army set up checkpoints in Hamouria and Saqba and the next morning continued to advance towards Arbin from the east (Hamouria) towards Arbin. The army entered Arbin from more than one axis and remained there until the next morning.
The army continued the mission within the city and the militants were stationed next to the Great Mosque in Arbin was taken over and the militants fled towards Jisreen and Deir al-Asafir and General Kamal and his colleagues remained in Arbin for three days, with some forces settling in Hamouria, Arbin, Saqba, Beit Sawa and Misraba in the form of checkpoints”
Kamal Atiyeh’s role in East Ghouta appears to end here, his battalion largely redeployed to the northern Qalamoun shortly after this offensive. The operation succeeded in returning much of western East Ghouta to regime control by January 30, 2012. It was the first true military operation in Damascus, but within a few months the opposition was able to re-organize and mount its own, bigger offensive against regime territory in East Ghouta, West Ghouta, South Damascus, and the city itself. Douma, meanwhile was still surrounded by a ring of checkpoints, existing under a semi-siege with security forces stationed in all the city’s large buildings. As 2012 wore on, the regime began to increasingly use jets and helicopters to bomb the residents. It was not until November 2012 that armed opposition groups managed to liberate the city, reconnecting Douma with the rest of East Ghouta and enabling many of its residents to return home for the first time in months.